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The chief Merit of the Have System.
The deep interest taken in all matters relating to the Hare
system of voting and counting at the recent elections in Hobart
and Launceston is indicated by the large number of queries
put to the writer during the last three months. It is curious,
however, that the large body of enquirers and critics restrict
their attention mainly to questions relating either to the mode
of voting, or to the mode or modes adopted for determining
the quota-excesses ; but, most of all, the general attention is
restricted to obscure details of no importance concerning the
infinitesimal influence of the element of chance still unelimi-
nated by the Tasrnanian Clark-Hare method provided for
the transfer and distribution of the quota-excess of the
second order.*
This unfortunate restriction is equivalent to a representation
of the play of Hamlet with the part of the Prince of Denmark
cut out.
The Hamlet of the Hare system, as a whole, is not the
mere mode of preference and transfer vote to which general
attention is too often restricted. The latter aids are important
no doubt, but of themselves they can only be regarded as
valuable accessories of the Hare system. The keystone of the
Hare system, upon which commonly too little or no attention
is directed, is the Hare-constitution of large electoral divisions.
Without the latter all the nice arrangements of first, second,
third, &c, preferences, and transfer of quota-excesses and
lowest excluded candidate votes, would be a cumbrous farce.
With the former secured, together with even the ordinary one
man one vote principle, the results attained would be such an
improvement upon methods hitherto prevailing that they would
* That is, on all quota-excesses obtained after the first count by the aid of
transfer ballot-papers. Those quota-excesses which are produced by the
distribution of the first count alone are treated differently by our law, and
for the sake of reference and distinction are here designated quota-excesses
of the First Order.
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not fall far short of the more complete Hare scheme with its
method of preference and transfer voting.
Those who ignore this keystone or foundation of the Hare
system, and restrict their attention entirely to peddling or
unimportant details—such as the element of chance involved in
quota-excess transfer votes—fail altogether to comprehend the
grandeur and perfection of the cardinal features of the system,
which secures just and equitable representation of all forces
whether of majorities or minorities. The main feature of the
Hare-Electorate or Electoral Division is, that it shall be
sufficiently large and untrammelled so as to permit the units of
any representative party or body of opinion to unite together,
if numerous enough to command a quota ; that is, such a pro-
portion of electors, as on the basis of numbers, would entitle
the latter to return their just share, viz. one parliamentary
representative. This provision also involves the breaking
down of all arbitrary and unreasonable sub-divisions which,
as in the unequal ward system of cities, have hitherto pre-
vented the otherwise wasted surplusage of aggregate majorities
or minorities, in one division of common locality interests,
from joining forces with the weaker members of their respec-
tive parties similarly restricted in a neighbouring arbitrary
sub-division ; and so unjustly preventing the true ideal of real
equality of representation, i.e., representation of minorities and
majorities in proportion to numbers. That this should be
regarded as the most important feature of the Hare system is
certain, and is so regarded by ail great thinkers who have
devoted any attention to the subject. This opinion is suf-
ficiently supported by a quotation from one of England's
greatest thinkers—John Stuart Mill (p. 56, 57, " On Repre-
sentative Government ") : " But real equality of representation
is not obtained unless any set of electors amounting to the
average number of a constituency, wherever . . . they
happen to reside, have the power of combining with one
another to return a representative. This degree of perfection
in representation appeared impracticable until a man of great
capacity, fitted alike for large general views and for the con-
trivance of practical details—Mr. Thomas Hare—had proved
its possibility by drawing up a scheme for its accomplishment,
embodied in a draft of an Act of Parliament ; a scheme which
has the almost unparalleled merit of carrying out a great
principle of government in a manner approaching to ideal per-
fection as regards the special object in view, while it attains
incidentally several other ends of scarcely inferior importance.
. . . . The more these works are studied the stronger I
venture to predict will be the impression of the perfect feasi-
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bility of the scheme and its transcendent advantages. Such
and so numerous are these that, in my conviction, they place
Mr. Hare's plan among the very greatest improvements yet
made in the theory and practice of government." The italics
are mine.
It cannot be too strongly emphasised, therefore, that the
chief causes which tend to produce and perpetuate unfair and
unequal representation are (1) inequalities in the magnitude of
the population of the various electoral divisions, and (2) the
unnecessary multiplication of artificial boundaries, restricting
unjustly the voting force to too narrow an area, and thereby
preventing the necessary and fair combination of persons who
desire to act together, without which their forces are wasted
or misdirected.
The following illustration will help to convey more clearly
how any great inequalities in the size of electoral divisions,
conjoined with unnecessary artificial barrier sub-divisions, may
prevent the reasonable combination of the elemental forces, and
may even prevent a strong majority within a city from securing
representation justly proportionate to their total numbers.
Let us conceive the City of Hobart as having 6000 voters,
returning six Members to Parliament. On the basis of numbers
it is clear, if there were no artificial barriers to reasonable com-
binations, that any body of persons properly organised could
return that proportion of representatives which would fairly
correspond with their numbers.
But suppose the major party X, constituting two-thirds of
the City electorate, to be distributed unequally, and their voting
force restricted within the limit of six separate unequal electoral
divisions of the City, as in the following illustration, and that
for simplicity they are opposed by one other party Y in each
division, thus
—
City. Distribution. Total.
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By this curious illustration it is shown how, notwithstanding
its superior numbers in the aggregate, the major party X has
been robbed of a fourth of its representative power by the
combined adverse circumstances of artificial inequalities in
the size or composition of its electoral divisions, and the
unnecessary artificial restriction of voting power within each
unnecessary artificial subdivision. By such unfair artificial
barriers the major party X—even aided by the wisest organisa-
tion—can only return half the number of representatives,
whereas, in equity, it should return tmo-thiras ; and, con-
versely, the minor party Y by such means returns half the
number of representatives, when in all fairness and equity they
should, under ideally proper conditions, only return two, or
one-third.
It is the chief merit of the Hare system that it entirely
removes all such artificial barriers to just and real representa-
tion of the various parties ; for, by its abolition of unwise
artificial restrictions it gives full fair play to all the individual
forces, and it enables the surplusage of any one division to
come to the aid of its own party in any other division, so that
no vote would form the element of a lost or wasted surplusage.
By the Hare system the inequalities of electoral subdivisions
are practically rendered equal and harmless.
The major party X would in all fairness return four
members, and the minor party Y would, in returning two
members, be also justly dealt with, as this is the number which
in all fairness it has a right to claim or expect.
The constitution of electoral divisions is thus shown to be
the most important feature of the Hare system, and this
importance must not be disregarded when acknowledging the
full merit of its splendid accessory, the Hare method of
preference and transfer vote.
The Merits of the Preference and Transferable Vote.
The most valuable accessory, not the primary principle, of
Hare's system is the scheme of the Quota-excess and. lowest
excluded Candidate Transfer Vote. In the ordinary system
of voting it often happens that the fair power of majorities
and minorities is wasted by the manner in which the votes are
given. The voter has no certain knowledge, and is often
obliged to guess his own party's strength. If the voter's one
particular choice gets, unnecessarily, too many votes from his
own party, and, therefore, useless to him, it may so happen
that the second, third, &c. in the order of the voter's preference
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are, from this lack of knowledge, deprived of votes to such an
extent that an opposite party's representatives are returned in
larger number than their aggregate strength, if fairly measured,
would entitle them. Hare's method of preference vote in a
very large measure obviates this defect. By indicating his
other favourite candidates in order of decreasing preference or
increasing order of detestation by 1, 2, 3, &c. no previous
knowledge of strength is necessarv. The Hare method is
per se a sort of special providence, preventing the waste of
valuable votes by automatically distributing surplus strength
fairly and exactly to the next and next of preference* until at
last the full fair strength of the particular party is properly
determined. If combinedly in this way any party fails to
return one representative, it is because all the members of the
party are too feeble in numbers to have the right to be repre-
sented ; if the party on the whole returns one, two, three, or
more representatives it is, for the best of all reasons, because
this is the exact representation to which, by force of numbers,
it is justly and reasonably entitled.
Thus the method of the Hare preference index, and the
transfer in order of preference, effects the part of a never-failing
providence, preventing the waste of valuable forces; or, in other
words, determining exactly the fair and reasonable repre-
sentation of all, in spite of difficulties concerning lack of
organisation, or perfect foreknowledge of the strength and the
proper allotment or distribution of voting forces. The only
persons who may oppose the Hare system aie the selfish
aggressor or the selfish indifferent; the former craves to main-
tain or gain more than justice; the latter too indifferent or
lazy to demand it.
Popular exaggerated estimates of the influence upon Results
of the Distribution of the Quota-excess of the First and
Second Order.
In the Hobart election the distribution of quota-excesses of
the first and second order, although differing to a great extent
relatively, was, as is the general experience, of little or no
absolute importance in altering the effect of the values of first
counts and lowest excluded candidates' preference votes in
determining the final order of the results of the election. In
Launceston, it so happened, there was no quota-excess of the
first order, i.e., on the first count, and, consequently, there
* Tf not preference it equally serves to indicate usefully order of detesta-
tion or dislike, No. 1 being least detested, No. 2 next in order of dislike,
No. 3, 4, 5 in a similar way next in order of candidates disliked. Even in
the order of dislike it must be of service to the elector to see that his most
disliked candidates are handicapped by his influence.
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could be no inclusion of this first to form a subsequent redis-
tributed detail element of chance in the determination of its
only one quota-excess (Hartnoll 16) of the second order. The
total influence of all orders of quota-excess transfer votes in
Launceston was, therefore, for each candidate not excluded
actually 1 (minimum) to 9 (maximum) votes = 16 in all.
That is, the influence proportionate to the total effective votes
of all kinds was min. 0*04 per cent. ; max. 0*38 per cent. ;
total, 0*68 per cent.
The feebleness of this influence in altering the final deter-
mination of the all-powerful influences, viz., the first count
and the votes (two or higher preference) of the previously
excluded candidates, is seen by the results. For, although the
lowest candidate (Sutton, 283) before distribution was only
nine votes behind the next lowest in order (Fowler, 292), yet
the inclusion of quota-excess distribution of the second order,
although differing in force only by six votes, to the advantage
of the lowest, the same order of importance was undisturbed,
Fowler still keeping the lead by three votes ! This inevitable
result is beyond any shade of dispute, as, in the distribution of
the quota-surplus 16, there entered no element of chance
selection. Such an element could only enter where there was
a possibility of a portion of this 16 being afterwards redistri-
buted. In Launceston such a possibility could not occur. It
is proved, therefore, that in the Launceston election the possible
influence of the element of chance was positively nil.
In Hobart the final results, although affected by four quota-
excesses (one of the first order and three of the second), were,
even in the aggregate, too feeble to exercise any disturbing
influence upon the true relative positions which, as in Laun-
ceston, wrere altogether dominated and determined by votes of
first counts and by next in order preferences of lowest excluded
candidates.
The total force of the transfer votes of quota-excesses of the
first and second order in Hobart only amounted to 3*54 per
cent, of all effective votes, as shown by the following analysis :
—
pr Per cent.
Analysis. Trans-
totot(
!
1
f effectiveJ
' votes.
Quota-excess Votes r First Order (1) Fvsh 44 1*25
Ditto \ Second „ (3) Bradley,
I 81 2-29
I Mulcahy
VBoth (4) ... 125 3-54
All other effective votes 3411 96-46
Total effective votes 3536 100-00
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PCY C€llt
Difference between lowest candidate elected and to total.'
the highest of the candidates excluded 129 3*39
Highest number of votes originally transferred to
any one candidate of the quota-excess of the
first order (Fysh 44) which in case of re-
transfer still involves an infinitesimal element of
chance 27 0*76
Actual number of votes re-transferred by quota-
surpluses of second order and by transferred
votes of lowest excluded candidates in which
any element of chance selection was involved... 39 1 ' 10
Average number of such votes for each candi-
date 3-25 009
The above analysis is interesting and instructive. It shows
that among the 3536 total effective direct and next in order of
preference votes, only 125, or 3*54 per cent., were derived from
all quota-excesses ; that of these only 39 were redistributed in
which any element of chance entered under the method pro-
vided by Mr. Clark, Clause 115, Sect. VI., for the deter-
mination of the proportion by which the 39 papers were actually
distributed ; and that this, in the aggregate, only represents
1 -10 per cent, of all effective votes, or a mean of 325 votes per
candidate. As the total redistributed quota-excess votes of the
first order (39) only represent 3*25 per cent, of the final
difference between the lowest candidate elected and the next in
order— the highest candidate who was last excluded from the
poll—it is clearly demonstrated that the remaining element of
chance selection in practice is infinitesimal in its influence, and
did not in the slightest degree affect the relative order of can-
didates as mainly determined by the combined influence of
(No. 1 preference) votes of the first count, and Nos. 2 and 3
preferences of transfer votes of the lowest excluded candidates.
These latter together (3411) represent, as already shown, 9(r46
of the total effective voting force ; and this fact alone should
show that too much importance, by far, has been commonly
attached to all rival modes for dealing with the distribution of
quota-surpluses and their possible but small element of chance.
The reduction of the original small element of chance from
1*25 per cent, of all effective to O09 for each candidate should
surely satisfy anyone that the ideal elimination of elements of
chance, so far as the true order of final results are concerned,
have been practically and successfully achieved by the Clark-
Hare method introduced at the last general election in Hobart
and Launceston.
If still, however, it is desired to entirely eliminate the
remaining infinitesimal element of chance in the redistribution
of any portion of quota-surpluses, the law may, with a very
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slight modification of Clause VI., Sect. 115, secure this end by
two simple practicable methods. The first method introduced,
but afterwards altered by Parliament, eliminated all element of
chance in the distribution of quota-surpluses of the first and
second orders, by first determining the full or aggregate force
of all ballot-paper preferences 1, 2, 3, respectively, and pro-
portionally distributing First-order quota-excesses on the basis
of the independent aggregate distribution of all No. 2
preferences ; and all quota-excesses of the Second order
similarly on the basis of the ascertained aggregate distribution
of all No. 3 preferences.
The second method suggested for arriving; at the same end
almost as perfectly as in the first method described is, while
determining, as in the existing law, the force of the No. 2
preferences for the purpose of allotting a corresponding
distribution of first order of any candidate's quota-excess, also
determine the full force of the No. 3 preferences in the same
individual candidate's original parcel {i.e., his first count).
Should a second order of quota-excess be secured subsequently
to any other candidate by the aid of the first quota-excess
division, let the latter portion of any quota-excess be allotted
according to proportion, ascertained under the original No. 3
preference votes of the elected candidate from whom such
surplus was obtained ; but, at the same time, limiting the
number of ballot-papers to be transferred to the proportion
which such original quota-surplus division bears to the
aggregate of all votes which go to form the quota-surplus of
the second order. The distribution of the due proportion of
votes which may have been derived from first votes and
lowest excluded candidate transfers to be distributed as nearly
as practicable in the proportion which the next available order
of preference is indicated upon such ballot-papers. The only
objection to this second method is that it is more complicated
and would involve more trouble and time in the final deter-
mining of the ballot. The balance of advantage, therefore,
remains in favour of the first method suggested.
General Questions regarding the Working Remits of the Hare
System.
The question most frequently put to the writer during the
last four months regarding the working results of the Clark-
Hare System of voting at the recent election at Hobart and
Launceston shows how wide and deep is the interest taken in
the matter, and the ordinary forms of misconception of several
of the more essential features of the Hare system enable him
to understand more clearly what are the points which it would
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be well to discuss more particularly, and, if possible, to eluci-
date. For this purpose I have thought it best to select the
more important of such questions in a systematically arranged
series in the form of Question and Answer. This method will
enable the ordinary enquirer to concentrate his or her attention
upon each point separately as it arises.
An endeavour has been made also to arrange the order of
the several queries or subjects so that the answers given to the
first in order may facilitate the comprehension of explanations
or observation of those which follow. The following are the
series of Questions dealt with in this way:
—
First Query.—What is the special nature of the modification
of the Hare system introduced by Mr. Clark at the last
General Election apart from the provision which restricted
its operation to the two cities, Hobart and Launceston ?
Answer.—The special modification introduced by Mr.
A. I. Clark, Attorney-General for Tasmania, is the pro-
vision devised by him for eliminating the element of
chance in the selection and distribution of quota-excesses
or surplus transfer votes.
In the original scheme of Mr. Thomas Hare there was an
element of chance connected with the appropriation of the
voting papers of any candidate polling in excess, of the ascer-
tained quota, inasmuch as it would depend upon the chance
position of the papers forming the excess. If the excess
papers were taken, however indiscriminately, from either top,
bottom, or middle of the whole parcel of first counts, it is
almost certain that the second and higher preferences would
vary with each chance selection, and the voters whose papers
were selected for transfer to next in order of preference would
thus by mere chance have an undue advantage in the determi-
nation of the candidates next in order of choice. Mr. Clark's
scheme disposes of this element of chance in quota-excesses of
the first order or first count, by giving each voter of the suc-
cessful candidate equal power in determining what papers
shall be selected for transfer. This is accomplished by redis-
tributing the whole of the successful candidates' voting papers
among the candidates not yet excluded from the poll on the
basis of the next in order of preference
—
i.e., No. 2—and after-
wards allotting to each candidate such a proportion of papers,
so distributed, to each candidate as is equivalent to the propor-
tion which the quola-excess bears to the total parcel of first
counts of the successful candidate.
Thus, if we assume that A secured 560 papers in the first
count, and the quota was determined to be 460 ; and also
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assume that the redistribution of A's 560 on the basis of No. 2
preference among1
,
say, B, C, and D, gave the following
results :
—
B, 230; C, 115; D, 115:
f B 50 : 230
Then, as quota-excess 100 : 5G0 :: \ C 25 : 115
(D25 : 115
In this manner each voter has equal power (viz.
-J $) in
determining the quota-surplus transfer distribution. B appro-
priates 50 of the 230 papers having No. 2 against his name;
C and I), respectively, appropriate 25 from among the papers
similarly having the No. 2 preference against their names.
This is a just distribution, and entirely removes the element of
chance, so far as the second preference is concerned. A
similar provision is made for removing, or rather minimising,
the very trifling element of chance in quota-excesses of the
second order
—
i.e., where a former transfer paper may again be
transferred to the third or next in order of preference—the
determinants in the latter case being the whole of the
transferred papers, only, which may have helped to complete a
candidate's quota. The process is extremely simple and
effective. The only objection to the method is that it may add
about 20 per cent, to the work of handling the papers, as in
the Hobart election. Where there are no excesses of the first
order, as in tfte Launceston election, it may add only about 4
per cent, to the work of handling and counting.
Second Query.—What is the probable total effective value of
all surplus votes transferred to candidates in next order
of preference in comparison with the totality of all other
forms of effective votes ?
Answer.—It varies considerably, according to the
number of quota-excesses of the first and second orders.
In Hobart the quota-excess votes of the first order
represented 1*25 per cent, of all effective votes. Those of
the second order represented 2*29 per cent. All quota-
excesses represented 3*54 per cent. In Launceston
election the whole of the quota-excess transfer votes only
represented 0*66 per cent, of all effective votes.
Third Query.—Does the Clark-Hare method entirely eliminate
the element of chance in the transfer of quota-excesses ?
Answer.—Yes, entirely, as regards quota-excesses of
the first order. As regards transfers of the second order,
I estimate that the element of chance for each candidate
only represents 0*09 per cent, of all effective votes. This
is so trifling an influence that it may be safelv ignored in
practice.
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Fourth Query.—What, approximately, are the relative effective
values of preference votes 1, "2, 3, and over, in determining
the return of any candidate ?
Answer.—For Hobart, the effective values were as
follows :—
First preference 77*66 per cent.
Second ditto 20-47
Third and higher 1*87
»
n
The relative values for Launceston closely agreed with
those for Hobart.
Fifth Query.— Whether is the first count, all effective votes,
or the aggregate of all counts (effective and ineffective)
the best index of the real measure of favour in which
the several candidates stand towards the electorate ?
Answer.—The aggregate of all counts, whether effective
or not, would seem to bo the truer index of the general
favour in which each candidate stands, because the
numbers polled at the first count may be greatly disturbed
by the action of those who are interested in the success of
two or more favourites who may be pretty well assured of
success, but whose order of preference might by some be
altered if sudden rumour suggested fears ibr any one of
the favoured group. This accidental action would tend
to conceal the true or exact measure of favour in the first
count. In the aggregate of effective votes polled the
true measure of favour is not quite correctly revealed by
the actual numbers recorded as regards successful candi-
dates, inasmuch as those who obtain the quota first are
by exclusion from poll deprived of the full force of the
second, third, and next in order of preference, all of which
are received, and swell the volume of the last successful
candidate. Thus, the first candidate who polled a quota
in Hobart, Sir Philip O. Fysh, was deprived of the latent
force of preference, 2, 3, &c. in his favour contained in
10 succeeding counts; Mr. Bradley was deprived
similarly of the latent force of seven succeeding counts ;
Mr. Clark of five. Of the successful candidates, Messrs.
Mulcahy, Crisp, and Page alone received the full force of
all effective preference votes. The fairer index of the
measure of general favour therefore seems to be the
aggregate of all preferences, whether effective or non-
effective, as shown in one of the appended tables.
Sixth Query.—What is the effect of the voter's restricting his
choice of order of preference to three candidates (the
minimum number compulsory by the Tasmanian law)?
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Answer.— It renders the voter's influence useless in the
determination of the fate of other candidates should his
own three preferences, without his aid, obtain a quota, or,
otherwise, be excluded, or eliminated, from the poll. Such
useless papers are said to be "exhausted. 1 ' No less than
200 votes, representing 7 per cent, nearly of all votes
polled, were rendered useless in this way by the voters'
self-imposed sacrifice of his own right or privilege. This
is a matter which demands more serious consideration, as
nearly twice the voting force of all the invalid papers (104)
were practically lost in the determination of the elections.
It is natural to suppose that the ordinary voter's interest
diminishes after his first three favourites are chosen in
their order of preference. But it should be borne in mind
that a further extension of indication of preference might
be serviceable to the voter in excluding those whom he
thought least desirable as representatives; for the order
1, 2, 3, need not be regarded as the index of favour. It is
just as serviceable in determining order of dislike, No. 1
being regarded as the candidate who is least in disfavour
;
the others, in sequence, being regarded as next in order of
greater disfavour.
Seventh Query.—How far was the voting force as a whole
reduced by invalid or defective ballot-papers ?—and what
was the nature of the defects which rendered the papers
invalid ?
Answer.—The voting force lost to the elections at
Hobart by reason of invalid papers is represented by 104
ballot-papers, equivalent to 3*65 per cent, of all ballot-
papers. The following is a summary of the defects :
—
Per cent.
No. No. to total
Defective preference numbering 45 ballot-paper.
Defective or unrecognisable
figures 4
49 1-72
Disfiguring or blank papers 1
Illegal marking and scoring ... 52
Adding signature 2
55 193
Total invalid papers 104 3*65
Only 61 of these invalid papers can be traced to their
first preference, and of these 46 were lost to successful
candidates, and 15 were lost to the unsuccessful candidates,
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From this analysis of defective ballot-papers it will be
seen that only 49, representing 1*72 per cent, of all ballot-
papers, can be attributed to the Hare system ; and upon
the first introduction of any new system such a result
might naturally be expected. The defects of 55 papers,
representing 1*93 percent, of all ballot-papers, are of such
a nature as might occur under any system of voting.
Some of the defects might have been avoided if the
ballot-papers gave clearer indication where the preference
numbers were to be written against each candidate's name.
If the preference number position were indicated by
a printed enclosing circle or square, and each name
separated by a clearly printed line, the defective papers
would be greatly reduced, thus :
—
j
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counting, and distributing ballot-papers be carried on
simultaneously with the work of polling.
Second.—Depute the duty of transmitting in due order
from time to time the various ballot-boxes (one at a time)
to counting-room to a particular officer, who shall see that
the contents are discharged upon the first sorting-table by
the Superintendent of the counting-room, who alone
possesses the power to unlock the boxes. A spare box
should be always available in the polling-room to take the
place of the box during its transmission and return from
counting-room.
Third.—Let the chief returning officer periodically
examine and finally determine all doubtful and invalid
papers set apart for his decision.
Fourth.—Prior to the day of election, the Superinten-
dent of the counting-room should make the necessary
calculations which would determine the number of
separate sorting and counting tables and the necessary
staff. The staff, prior to the day of election, should
receive an object lesson from the Superintendent in the
work that they are to be engaged, and the latter should
by actual trial satisfy himself that each one thoroughly
understands the particular process entrusted to him.
Fifth.—In the work of sorting and recording each
subdivision, marked A, B, C, D, E, F, no conversation or
discussion should be allowed. If a paper is challenged as
doubtfully invalid, it should, without discussion or com-
ment, be placed in the place set apart for doubtful
papers, to be finally determined by the decision of the
chief returning officer.
Sixth.—Apart from the candidates' onlooking scruti-
neers, there should be three officers set apart for each
recording table, which latter should be equipped with as
many named cells as there are candidates, and with two
extra cells for the reception of doubtful and invalid
papers respectively. The chief officer at each table
should take the central position, and his duty is to
examine each paper, and see at a glance whether valid,
doubtful, or invalid. If valid, he should quickly call
out name and preference number; thus :—Fysh, 1 ;
Bradley, 1 ; Clark, 1 ; Fysh, 1 ; Clark, 1 ; and simul-
taneously place each paper in its proper receptacle. The
recorders, one on each side, both enter a 1 in the proper
column for each name called out.
As each pair of sheets is completed, the chief clerk
should compare the totals of the one with the other, and
if they agree the pair of recording sheets should forthwith
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be initialled and transmitted to the superintendent's com-
piling table. If they do not agree the error must at
once be traced out and corrected. A septum of coloured
paper, placed in each cell above the last ballot-paper
entered in a former pair of recording sheets, will greatly
aid in facilitating the detection of such errors.
During the last general election at Hobart each record-
ing sheet had 50 lines, numbered from 1 to 50 at each
side, with a separate column for each candidate. As each
recording tick 1 was marked under each name on the line
immediately succeeding the last recorded tick for the same
person, it followed that as soon as any one candidate's
recording tick reached ihe fiftieth line the sheet was
complete, and the numbers of all the other candidates
could be ascertained by inspection without counting ; For
the line number of the last entry in each column would
indicate exactly the number of votes to be carried to total
at foot of recording sheet.
In this way the work of the superintendent in com-
piling the recording sheet totals was greatly facilitated,
and enabled him to show at any moment the aggregate
number polled for each candidate.
If the plan here indicated is adopted at any election,
there is every reason to believe that it would work satis-
factorily, and the final results of the election might be
ascertained and published within an hour of the close of
the poll.
The only work of the Hare system of ballot which
would have to be postponed until the close of the poll
would be the distribution of transfer votes from quota-
surpluses and lowest eliminated candidates.
HOW TO SIMPLIFY THE BALLOT BY THE
HARE SYSTEM TO THOSE WHO CANNOT
READ OR WRITE.
Many who otherwise regard the Hare system of voting with
favour, have objected to its introduction in Tasmania, on the
ground that the difficulties of instructing voters wTho can
neither read nor write would be practically insurmountable
;
and they believe that attempts to record the preference 1,2, 3,
or even I., II., III., against the persons chosen in this order
of preference by those who cannot read or write would involve
many mistakes, and largely increase the number of invalid
ballot-papers. Another, and perhaps a more serious objection
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to the use of written figures, ia thai t<> ;i great extent it invades
or endangers the wisely guarded secrecy <»f the ballot ; for the
figures written by many persons are as characteristic as their
writingi and might be recognised, and the name of the voter,
and how he recorded his vote, might thus be improperly
disclosed by persons subsequently handling the ballot-papers^
There arc. therefore, three difficulties to be met, and for
which BOme means should he devised to dispose of them, or, at
any rate, to lessen their evil effects, viz :—
1. To devise means wherehy voters, who are unable i<> read
or write, may readily determine the position and names of the
candidates preferred by them upon the ballot-paper when the
latter is placed in their hands.
k
2. To record the figures 1, 2, »'J, &c, against eaeli name
indicating voter's preference accurately and easily, without the
necessity of writing by hand.
3. To record these figures, showing order of preference in
such a manner as will fail to disclose to anyone the identity of
the voter who lnis privately recorded them. Having devoted
some attention to this very important matter, I think I cp.n
disclose a simple plan which would remove all such difficulties.
now TO DETERMINE THE NAMES OP PREFERRED
CANDIDATES UPON BALLOT-PAPER.
First, to help those who cannot read and of themselves are,
therefore, unable to determine the position of the names of the
candidates they prefer upon the hallot-paper, 1 would suggest
that immediately the names of candidates for election are
declared let there be prepared a large printed poster bill
recording in large print the names of the various candidates
exactly in the same style of type (except size), and in the same
order of sequence as the names will he printed on the ballot-
paper proper. A.gainst each name, in front, print boldly the
litho-photo of the head and features of the candidate. If these
large posters were affixed to the principal hoardings throughout
the city, where the names continuously associated with the
candidate's photograph would frequently meet the eye of the
citizens, it is certain that every voter, even though unable to
read or write, would within seven days be well acquainted with
each candidate's printed name ami could locate the exact
position when* such name would be found upon the ballot-paper
when placed in his hand, on the day of election, without the
aid of anyone. The secret of the manner in which such
person voted would thus be as secure as it is now to persons
who aro able to read and write.
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HOW ILLITERATE PERSONS—WITHOUT PERSONAL AID—MAY
RECORD THE FIGURES 1, 2, 3, ETC., IN THE DESIRED
ORDER OF PREFERENCE WITH THE GREATEST EASE AND
WITH PERFECT ACCURACY.
In addition to marking-pencils let there be provided in the
veiled recording chamber a shelf holding as many figure
stamps as there are seats. For Hobart six, for Launceston four.
Let the size and sequence of position of these stamps correspond
exactly with the figures which the several stamps are devised
to impress when stamped against, and in front of, the name
selected ; thus :
—
•
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the simple method of impressing the stamp against any name
might be jriven in some convenient ante-room, and the care
that due order of the stamps in proper position is preserved in
the veiled recording chamber might be seen to by some officer,
after each candidate has recorded his vote.
I hope the suggestions made will commend themselves to
those who have the responsibility of securing the success of
the election by the Hare system of ballot, and also to all
who are jealous of preserving intact the secrecy of the ballot.
THE ACTUAL DISTRIBUTION OF QUOTA
EXCESSES BY THE CLARK-HARE METHOD.
Some persons are fearful that the able returning officers at
Hobart and Launceston—Messrs Davies and Sadler—supported
as they were by the best legal opinion, and assisted as they
were by persons skilled in the particular work, have failed to
carry out the law in all its entirety in the distribution of quota-
surpluses at the last general election.
But, from the expressed statements of some of the critics it
is very obvious that their fears arise either from an imperfect
or hazy notion of the exact processes expeditiously and
correctly carried out by the responsible officers referred to, or
from a very faulty notion of what our law required to be
carried out. From my official position at Hobart— under Mr.
Davies (acting-superviser of the counting processes)— I had
the best opportunity of knowing how the various operations of
the counting and distribution of ballot-papers were performed,
and I can trust that I will be credited when I assure all persons
that every process was faithfully carried out, expeditiously and
smoothly, in strict compliance with every provision of the law
as embodied in Section 115, i—x.
It would be altogether inexcusable on my part, having such
responsibilities, if I had not made myself thoroughly acquainted
with every provision of the law affecting each of the stages of
counting and distribution, for I had the advantage of ample
time and opportunity for making myself fully acquainted with
all the nice points where some difficulties of interpretation
might arise. Moreover, I had the advantage of familiar
discussion and helpful advice from the law officers of the
Crown, and from other trained legal authorities on every
occasion that a possible shade of doubt presented itself to my
mind as regards some of the more obscure provisions. The
result was that I had the comfort of knowing before I engaged
actively on my duties that in the methods for every stage
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arranged and ultimately carried out by me as supervising1
assistant under Mr. Davies, I had the sanction and hearty
approval of the law advisers of the Crown. With my own
judgment independently concurring with the special advice of
.
the law officers, who originally drew up every one of the
provisions of Section 115, I have no fear that any person,
however astute, who has not had the grave responsibilities
of execution, and who has not devoted the same time and
trouble to the study of our Electoral Act, 1896, Section 115,
will be successful in the discovery of any flaw either in the
interpretations put upon its various provisions, or in the pro-
cesses adopted for carrying it into effect.
Those who profess to have discovered a flaw in the mode of
determining the quota-excess in Hobart have misled them-
selves by taking hold of only a part of the truth—a source of
danger in most cases to inexperienced persons.
So far as the ordinary misconceptions are concerned regarding
the provisions made for determining the division of transferable
quota-surpluses, it is apparent for the most part that they arise
from unskilled or hasty reading of clauses v. and iv\,
Section 115. Both of these clearly provide for the manner in
which quota-surpluses are to be distributed, and both have for
their object the distribution of the excess, freed altogether
from arbitrary selection by returning officer, and freed, as fairly
as practicable, from the element of chance selection. But the
stumbling block of the average inexperienced or incautious
critic is his failure to discern that the law recognises and
distinguishes two distinct orders of quota-excess, while the in-
cautious critic either only recognises one, or confounds or
mixes up part of the provision of the one when dealing with
the other. For the sake of greater clearness we may call the
quota-excess provided for in Clause V. as quota-excesses of the
first order, and the quota-excesses contemplated in Clause VI.
as those of the second order. Now the manner in which the
quota-excess of the first order is to be determined in distribution
is altogether different from the manner provided in Clause VI.
for the determination and distribution of quota-excess of the
second.
For the former (i.e., first order) the quota-excess—as in case
of the only one of this order, the Fysh surplus, 44—Clause V.,
" Shall include as nearly as practicable in respect of each
candidate the same proportion of ballot-papers having the
figure 2 set opposite to his name as the number of such ballot-
papers included in the whole parcel bears to the total number
of ballot-papers in the whole parcel.'" The quota-excess of
the first order has been derived wholly from the successful
candidate's l's without the aid of a single transfer ballot-paper
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Irom any other candidate, and hence the law provides that for
such first order quota-excess the determinants of mode dis-
tribution are, as in the Fysh surplus
—
the whole of his own
original ballot-papers of the first count.
For determining; the manner in which quota-excesses of the
second order shall be distributed the law is entirely different ;
for it excludes altogether the successful candidates' first count
ballot-papers as determinants, and restricts the determinant of
distribution solely to the total ballot-paper* previously trans-
ferred.
The successful candidates of the second order quota-excesses
cannot by this provision—whether desirable or otherwise—have
their own first count papers included among the determinants
of distribution ; the law clearly confining this function 1o the
various subsequently transferred ballot-papers obtained pre-
ferentially from other candidates, and by whose aid the quota
and its excess were actually obtained.
I hope this explantion will satisfy all reasonable persons
that the various processes of the ballot in Hobart and Laun-
ceston were correctly carried out, and were not marred in any
way by flaws in the manner in which the whole work was
carried out.
It is interesting to note that Hobart alone had a quota-
excess of the first order to distribute, while of quota-excesses
of the second order Hobart had three and Launceston only
one.
In conclusion, let me record gratefully, not merely my own
personal indebtedness, but that of Tasmania, to the pioneer
advocate of True Representation of the People in Australia
(Miss C. H. Spence, of Adelaide), whose life's devotion to
the cause of True Representation has not only greatly in-
fluenced, but has won the admiration and respect of England's
greatest statesmen. To Miss Spence's unwearied advocacy,
by word and pen, the success of the introduction of the Hare
System in Tasmania by Mr. Clark is largely due. I only
hope she will live to see throughout the civilized world the
general adoption of the Hare System of voting, which alone
secures any practical approximation to a Fair and True Repre-
sentation of the People.
THE HARE SYSTEM AT HOBART
Ballot Recording Sheet,
Results of the various C(
Parliamentary Election.
Giving the Actual ounts at the recent
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THE HARE SYSTEM AT HOBART.-The Complete Returns.-!
at the recent Parliamentary Election, worked out
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lowing Ballot Recording Sheet gives the actual results of the various counts
ality. The quota, it will be remembered, was 457 :
—
[DDLE-
roxE.
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GENERAL ELECTION, HOBART.
20th January, 1897.
Analysis showing the separate and cumulative value and
distribution of the effective portion only of the various
Preference and Transfer Votes :
—
Candidates.
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Further Analysis of the Results of the Ballot for Election
of Representatives at Hobart, 20th January, 1897, show-
ing the Separate and Cumulative Value of all Preference
Votes (1), (2), and (3), whether effective or ineffective :
—
Candidates.
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ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE CLARK-HARE SYSTEM
OF ELECTION ADOPTED IN TASMANIA.
Examples of marking Ballot-papers.
(i.) Where there are NINE Candidates for SIX Seats.
Austin
Dickens
Fielding
Ciissing 4
Lytton 3
Meredith 5
Richardson 6
Scott 1
Thackeray 2
Austin 5
Dickens (}
Fielding 4
Gissins
Lytton
Meredith
Richardson 2
Scott 3
Thackerav 1
(ii.) Where there are SIX Candidates for FOUR Seats.
Burns 4 Burns 4
Drvden Drvden 3
Milton 2 Milton 2
Pope Pope
Shakespeare 1 Shakespeare
Wordsworth 3 Wordsworth 1
Examples of an Election of more than One Mem-
ber FOR THE SAME DISTRICT.
Suppose there are Four Members to be elected, and there
are Six Candidates, and the total number of valid votes polled
is 3000.
In accordance with the directions contained in Section 115,
the number of valid votes (3000) will be divided by the
number of Members to be elected (4), and the result (750)
will be the quota of votes required to elect a Member.
First Count.
A has 800 first votes. A and D are declared elected,
and the surplus of A's first votes
is transferred to the other candi-
dates who are marked 2 on th«
B has 420 first votes. same ballot-papers(in pursuance
of Sect. 115, Sub-sect V.) in such
a manner that each of the other
candidates receives the same pro-
C has 180 first votes. portion of such surplus votes as
all the papers on which his name
is marked with the figure 2 in
the parcel bear to the whole 800
D has 780 first vote? ballot-papers in the said parcel.
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E has 720 first votes.
F has 100 first votes.
The numbers on the Second Conn
A, 800 — 50 votes transferred to
other candidates= 750 (elected).
B, 420 + 20 votes transferred from
the surplus votes of D — 440
C, 180
-f- 10 votes transferred from
the surplus votes of D = 190
D, 780 — 30 votes transferred to
other candidates= 750 (elected).
E, 720 + 40 votes transferred from
the surplus votes of A = 760
(elected).
F, 100 + 10 votes transferred from
the surplus votes of A = 110.
A has 50 surplus votes, and as
E is marked 2 on 640 out of the
800 papers, and F is marked 2
on 160, it follows that E is
entitled to four-fifths and F to
one-fifth of the surplus. The
Returning Officer will therefore
transfer 40 of A's surplus votes
to E, and the remaining 10 of
A's surplus votes to F.
D has a surplus of only 30
votes, and, following the same
course, 20 of his surplus ballot-
papers are found to be trans-
ferable to B, and the remaining
10 to C.
t will then be as follows :—
A, D, and E are now declared
elected, but another Member is
required, and there must there-
fore be another transfer of any-
surplus votes and a Third Count.
The only candidate who had a
surplus on the Second Count
was E, who had a surplus of
3 votes in consequence of
having had 40 of A's surplus
votes transferred to him. He
will retain permanently 30 of
those surplus votes because
the) r are necessary to give him
the requisite quota of 750 votes,
but the other 10 of A's surplus
ballot-papers will now be trans-
ferred to the candidates whose
names are marked on them with
the figure 3, and on them the
name of B is marked 3.
The numbers on the Third Count will therefore stand as
follows
:
—
A 750 (elected)
B,440 + 10 votes
transferred from
E's surplus on the
Second Count = 450
190
D ,,,.., ., 750 (elected)
There still remains a Member
to be elected, and there are not
any more surplus votes to be
transferred. It therefore be-
comes necessary to reduce the
number of candidates by ex-
cluding- the one who is lowest
•
on the poll as it now stands,
and to transfer his votes to the
candidates who are marked 2
on the ballot-papers which have
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E 750 (elected)
110
hitherto been counted for him.
The lowest candidate on the
poll is F, with 1 10 votes, and
be is now excluded. Upon 80
of the ballot-papers hitherto
counted for F the name of B is
marked 2, and on the other 30
of them the name of C is
marked 2.
The numbers on the Fourth Count will therefore be as
follows :—
A 750 (elected) Only three candidates have
succeeded up to the present
B, 450
-f 80 votes time in obtaining the requisite
transferred from quota of votes, and it therefore
F = 530 (elected) becomes necessary to reduce
again the number of candidates
C, 190
-f 30 votes by excluding the one who is
transferred from lowest on the poll as it now
F = 220 stands. The lowest candidate
is C, and he is excluded, leaving
D 750 (elected) only the same number of candi-
dates as there are Members to
E 750 (elected) be elected, viz., A, B, D, and
E, who are therefore declared
elected, and the election is
closed,
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